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 I. Introduction 
 Real property is the most valuable and potentially contentious property owned by many 
people at the point of death. 1 Th e recent debate surrounding the so-called  ‘ demen-
tia tax ’ highlights the signifi cance of the family home from an inheritance perspective, 2 
as does as the emphasis on the importance of passing it on under the new residence nil 
rate band legislation for inheritance tax purposes. 3 More immediately, land formerly 
(co-)owned by a deceased person may already be a home for surviving family members. 4 
Th is may create some tensions between testamentary freedom on the one hand, and the 
notion of  ‘ dynamic ’ security for the protection of purchasers prioritised by the land registra-
tion system on the other. 
 Th is chapter analyses the law on dealings with registered land aft er a registered propri-
etor has died, alongside relevant Land Registry practice, identifying several potential 
conceptual and practical problems in the area. Section II discusses the tension between 
the basic conclusiveness of the register under the Land Registration Act 2002 and the 
logical impossibility of the dead owning property, the possibility that registered title will 
not devolve onto personal representatives and the associated risks of fraud. Section III 
highlights the particular diffi  culties related to (previous) co-ownership and the position 
of surviving trustees in light of the personal representative ’ s duty to retain control of estate 
property until it is distributed to genuinely intended (or mandated) benefi ciaries. 
 Th e chapter considers whether law and practice are fi t for purpose from the perspec-
tive of the interests of the now-deceased person, surviving co-owners, estate benefi ciaries, 
personal representatives, practitioners and their professional indemnity insurers, as well 
as considering the objectives of land registration, including by comparing the treatment 
of registered land with that of other forms of signifi cant property owned by now-deceased 
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persons. Section IV makes several tentative suggestions for reform in light of the conceptual 
diffi  culties relating to the accuracy of the land register, risks of fraud and threats to testa-
mentary freedom identifi ed. 
 II. Dealings with Registered Title Following 
the Death of a Registered Proprietor 
 A. Th e Dead Owning Property and the Conclusiveness 
of the Register 
 Th is subsection highlights the conceptual inconsistency between the impossibility of the 
dead owning property and the basic conclusiveness of the land register. 
 Blackstone wrote that  ‘ the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion ’. 5 It 
is a matter of logic that a dead person cannot own property, as distinct from her (qualifi ed) 6 
ability to direct what happens to her property on death by making a will while still alive. 7 
Nevertheless, a recently deceased person may still be the registered proprietor of land, and 
the appearance of her name in the register is treated as conclusive proof that she is the 
landowner. 8 Conceptually, neither the basic conclusiveness of the land register, nor the prin-
ciple of  ‘ title by registration ’, 9 nor the existence of statutory owner ’ s powers 10 can alter the 
logical fact that the dead cannot own property. Th is is true notwithstanding the fact that a 
major purpose of the Land Registration Act 2002 is to ensure that the land register  ‘ provides 
a decisive attribution of proprietorship ’ such that  ‘ [e]state owners are conclusively identi-
fi ed on the face of an authoritative public record ’. 11 Th e idea is that  ‘ titles  … derive from the 
register itself, rather than from the external rules of general property law ’, 12 such that the 
Land Registrar possesses a  ‘ metaphorical  “ Midas Touch ” ’. 13 Th is conceptual inconsistency 
contributes to what Goymour has called the  ‘ myth ’ of  ‘ title by registration ’. 14 
 When a person dies, her property will devolve onto her personal representative(s) under 
the Administration of Estates Act 1925, 15 executors in the case of testate succession and 
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administrator(s) in the case of (broadly) intestate succession. 16 Such property in principle 
includes real property, although the relevant property should be considered the  estate in 
land since a concept of  dominium over land has historically been  ‘ alien ’ to English Law. 17 
 Th ere is, however, a diffi  culty in the case of registered land with the notions that a 
dead person cannot own property and that legal title to her assets vests in her personal 
representatives. Th e diffi  culty essentially relates to the authority of the register. Th e basic 
conclusiveness of the register at any given time does not of course mean that it is static. 
A major purpose of the system is precisely to aid the  transfer of land, even if full elec-
tronic conveyancing (allowing simultaneous completion and registration) looks unlikely to 
materialise in the near future. 18 Th e legislation has been described as  ‘ very clearly  “ trans-
action driven ” ’, 19 and it has been said that  ‘ registration of title is the cornerstone of land 
 marketability ’. 20 Th erefore, the 2002 Act allows for alteration of the register for the purposes 
of  ‘ correcting a mistake ’,  ‘ bringing the register up to date ’,  ‘ giving eff ect to any estate, right 
or interest excepted from the eff ect of registration ’, or  ‘ removing a superfl uous entry ’, 21 with 
rectifi cation being a more tightly controlled form of alteration that  ‘ involves the correction 
of a mistake ’ and  ‘ prejudicially aff ects the title of a registered proprietor ’. 22 Th e notion of 
 ‘ bringing the register up to date ’ in the context of the death of a registered proprietor would 
clearly derive its authority from the general law contained in the Administration of Estates 
Act 1925. 
 In the absence of full electronic conveyancing, there will inevitably be a point in 
time with any transfer of land where the transferee has a right to be registered under the 
general law but has not yet been entered as the proprietor (and the transferor remains 
as such). In inter vivos situations, this  ‘ registration gap ’ produces the diffi  culty that, as a 
matter of land registration law, the transferee remains vulnerable to rights created by the 
transferor before that transferor is removed, 23 although in a transactional context this 
vulnerability is tempered by the protection of an Offi  cial Search with Priority in favour of the 
transferee. 24 Admittedly, the creation of interests during the registration gap is not an option 
for a deceased person herself, which in some respects makes the succession context less 
problematic than the inter vivos one. 
 Despite the conceptual diffi  culties referred to above, the deceased person will remain 
on the register as the registered proprietor unless and until removed via alteration, 25 
  16  Th e vesting in the case of the executor occurs at the moment of death (rather than the grant of probate), 
while for an administrator this does not occur until the grant of letters of administration. In the interim, the estate 
of an intestate will vest in the Public Trustee, who has a limited role in respect of the property:  JR  Martin and 
 N    Caddick (eds),  Williams, Mortimer  & Sunnucks  – Executors, Administrators and Probate ,  20th edn ( London , 
 Sweet  & Maxwell ,  2013 ) [41-01] – [41-08]. 
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  18  See, eg,  Law Commission ,  Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper ( Consultation Paper 
No 227 ,  2016 ) ch 20. 
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and a personal representative cannot be registered as the proprietor without a grant of 
probate or letters of administration or a court order appointing the applicant as a personal 
 representative. 26 It is signifi cant that it can take some time before a grant of representa-
tion is obtained aft er death (albeit that the process is generally quick once an application 
has been made), 27 and in 2015 it was said in particular that  ‘ [i]ntestate estates can be very 
slow to be dealt with and there may be some  … estates [relating to deaths aft er 1995] still 
unadministered ’. 28 Th is creates particular conceptual diffi  culties since, unlike in inter vivos 
conveyancing, it is not merely that the (deceased) former owner  ought no longer to be 
recognised as the legal owner and registered proprietor, but that she  cannot be the legal 
owner under the general law and therefore cannot logically be the registered proprietor 
either. 
 To add to the conceptual diffi  culties and tensions, as the Land Registry explains in its 
Practice Guide on death: 
 Th e personal representative(s) of a deceased sole proprietor of the registered estate, or of a charge 
or mortgage may, without fi rst being registered themselves in that capacity, deal with that regis-
tered estate or charge. Th ey may do this by way of a transfer, or a transfer by way of an assent or 
appropriation using the appropriate form in either case. 29 
 Where this occurs, the personal representative must still produce the same evidence of his 
entitlement to dispose of the property as if he had been registered, 30 such that he cannot 
deal with registered land until the grant of probate or letters of administration. In any event, 
registered title to the land might not therefore ever be transferred into the names of the 
personal representatives (such a course of action potentially being considered to involve 
unnecessary complication and cost), even though the Land Registry ’ s own Practice Guide 
states that  ‘ the legal estate vests in the personal representatives on the death of the sole 
proprietor ’, 31 although admittedly the Act extends owner ’ s powers to those who are  ‘ enti-
tled to be registered as the proprietor ’ as well as those who are actually so registered. 32 
A  ‘ transfer on the death  … of an individual proprietor ’ is specifi cally excluded from the 
list of dispositions that are  required to be registered (somewhat misleadingly described 
as registr able dispositions), 33 such that the  ‘ disposition will operate at law immediately ’. 34 
Where title is voluntarily transferred to a personal representative, however, the registrar 
must add  ‘ executor or executrix (or administrator or administratrix) of [name] deceased ’ 
to the register entry. 35 
  26  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, r 163(1) – (2). 
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  28  C  Sawyer and  M  Spero ,  Succession, Wills and Probate ,  3rd edn ( Abingdon ,  Routledge ,  2015 )  167 . 
  29  HM  Land Registry ,  ‘ Practice Guide 6: Devolution on the Death of a Registered Proprietor ’, available at:  https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/devolution-on-the-death-of-a-registered-proprietor/practice-guide-
6-devolution-on-the-death-of-a-registered-proprietor [2.2]. 
  30  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, r 162(1). 
  31  Land Registry (n 29 above) [6]. See also  Williams, Mortimer  & Sunnucks (n 16 above) [46-03];  Ijacic (executor 
of the estate of Tripkovic) v Game Developments Ltd [ 2009 ]  EWLandRA 2008_1081 , [2009] EWLandRA 2008_1083 
[2] (Deputy Adjudicator Simon Brilliant). 
  32  Land Registration Act 2002, s 24(b). 
  33  Land Registration Act 2002, s 27(5)(a). 
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  35  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, r 163(4). 
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 Signifi cantly, the Land Registration Rules specifi cally provide that: 
 Th e registrar shall not be under a duty to investigate the reasons a transfer of registered land by a 
personal representative of a deceased sole proprietor or last surviving joint proprietor is made nor 
to consider the contents of the will and, provided the terms of any restriction on the register are 
complied with, he must assume, whether he knows of the terms of the will or not, that the personal 
representative is acting correctly and within his powers. 36 
 Th is picture, including the possible delays in obtaining a grant, creates conceptual diffi  cul-
ties which detract from the internal coherence of the law. It also produces a risk of fraud in 
light of information easily obtainable about a deceased person. 37 
 B. Th e Risk of Fraud 
 Th e situation described in the last subsection creates a possibility that a fraudster could 
impersonate the deceased person, and transfer the property to a purchaser or mortgage the 
property to a lender who is unaware of the death. 38 Th e Land Registry has said that  ‘ [i]n 
most instances of fraud it is the purported disponor, rather than the applicant [for registra-
tion], who acts fraudulently ’. 39 If such impersonation is possible in the context of a person 
who is still alive, 40 with one commentator describing it as  ‘ astonishingly simple ’, 41 it may 
be all the easier on death. Even if the purchaser (or a chargee) takes the trouble to inspect 
the property (as may now be expected in order to secure a full indemnity) 42 there may be 
no-one with a proprietary interest in discoverable actual occupation for the purposes of 
schedule 3, paragraph 2 of the Land Registration Act 2002. It follows that the purchaser 
may take free of any legitimate interests of those whom the deceased left  behind because 
the interests do not override. 43 Th is constitutes a signifi cant interference with the deceased ’ s 
testamentary freedom. 
 Th e theft  of a deceased person ’ s identity (or  ‘ ghosting ’ ) is  ‘ made possible by a lag 
between the decedent ’ s death and the date that fi nancial institutions, agencies  … and credit-
reporting bureaus update their databases ’. 44 Identity theft  is said to be  ‘ more likely ’ in 
situations such as  ‘ where a relationship breaks down ’,  ‘ where a property is empty or is bought 
  36  ibid, r 162(2). 
  37  S  Kirchheimer ,  ‘ Protecting the Dead From Identity Th eft  ’,  AARP Bulletin ( 2013 ), available at:  www.aarp.org/
money/scams-fraud/info-03-2013/protecting-the-dead-from-identity-theft .html . 
  38  See, eg,  Ijacic v Game Developments (n 31 above), considered in detail below. 
  39  HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Practice Guide 67: Evidence of Identity; Conveyancers ’, available at:  https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/evidence-of-identity-conveyancers/practice-guide-67-evidence-of-identity-conveyanc-
ers [2]. See further L Xu,  ‘ Updating Land Registration Law and Practice: Some Lessons From China ’ Chapter 15 in 
this volume. 
  40  See, eg,  Swift  1st Ltd v Chief Land Registrar [ 2015 ]  EWCA Civ 330 , [2015] Ch 602. 
  41  S Evans,  ‘ Was Privacy in Land Ownership Such a Bad Th ing ? ’ [2017]  Conv 357, 358. 
  42  J Pownall and R Hill,  ‘ Th e Land Registry ’ s Perspective: Th e Practical Challenges of Land Registration ’ in 
Goymour (n 10 above) 13. 
  43  Land Registration Act 2002, s 29. 
  44  H  Davidson ,  ‘Aft ermath of the Fight Over Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets :  Th e Revised UFADAA and its 
Implications for Legislators and Professional Advisors ’ ( 2017 )  7  Tax Development Journal  58, 61 . 
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to let ’,  ‘ where the owner is abroad or absent ’, and  ‘ where the owner is infi rm or in a home ’. 45 
A situation where a sole registered proprietor has died has something in common with each 
of these. 
 If the  ‘ vendor ’ in these circumstances is represented by a conveyancer, the purchaser is 
unlikely to take independent steps to verify the vendor ’ s identity, 46 and the vendor ’ s convey-
ancer ’ s standard identity checks 47 may be ineff ective if the conveyancer has been duped 
because the fraudster has the same name (potentially having changed it by deed poll) 48 as 
the deceased and claims that (for example) the property being sold was previously rented 
out, or simply produces to the conveyancer forged identifi cation documents in the name of 
the deceased. 49 Th ere are of course occasions where the conveyancer him/herself is a party 
to the fraud, or may inaccurately  appear to be such a party because it is an increasingly 
common tactic for legitimate law fi rms to be impersonated by the fraudster, making clever 
use of headed notepaper and subtle diff erences in an email address. 50 
 A fraudster could also simply transfer the land to himself or an associate for no 
consideration. Th e Land Registry will make some attempt to verify identity if a party to 
the transaction is unrepresented via its ID1 form, involving verifi cation by a solicitor or 
 similar. 51 Th at said, however well-versed a busy high-street solicitor may be in taking copies 
of a person ’ s identifi cation documents, solicitors are not trained to be forgery experts. Th e 
unconnected solicitor completing the ID1 form on behalf of an entirely unknown person 
who walks in apparently possessing all the correct documents can do no more than make 
the declaration on the ID1 that the person is a true likeness to their photograph, and that 
they have produced the required documents. 52 It is also, of course, easy for the fraud-
ster simply to impersonate a legitimate solicitor or conveyancer on the ID1. Th e risk of 
fraud therefore remains, and the Law Society claims that  ‘ [r]ecorded incidents of fraud are 
rising ’ in relation to real property. 53 Even though the Land Registry apparently  ‘ prevented 
frauds on properties valued in excess of  £ 92 million ’ between September 2009 and 
mid-January 2017, it accepts that  ‘ no system can be 100 per cent fraud-proof  ’ 54 and this will 
  45  HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Public Guide 17: How to Safeguard against Property Fraud ’ ( 2008 )  1 ; see now  HM Land 
Registry and Law Society ,  ‘ Property and Title Fraud ’ ( 2017 )  2 . 
  46  See, eg,  S  Cooper ,  ‘ Seller Fraud and Conveyancers ’ Liabilities ’ [ 2017 ]  Conv  325, 325 ; S Cooper,  ‘ Lack of Proper 
Care ’ in Goymour et al (n 10 above) 193. 
  47  Legal Sector Affi  nity Group ,  ‘Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for the Legal Sector ’ ( 2018 ) . 
  48  HM Land Registry and Law Society (n 45 above) 3; Law Commission (n 18 above) [14.94]. 
  49  In light of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) 
Regulations 2017, SI 692/2017, r 33(5), it is becoming increasingly common in practice to undertake an additional 
online identity check with a specialist agency in order to corroborate the identifi cation documents produced, a 
trend which is certainly welcome. 
  50  HM Land Registry and Law Society (n 45 above) [2.1]. 
  51  HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Form: Verify Identity: Citizen (ID1) ’, available at:  www.gov.uk/government/publications/
verify-identity-citizen-id1 . See further  SR  Coveney et al,  Ruoff  and Roper: Registered Conveyancing ( London ,  Sweet 
 & Maxwell ,  2017 ) [24.001.02]. 
  52  Indeed, it is surely true that solicitors or conveyancers are no more qualifi ed to verify somebody ’ s identity 
documents than any other person: yet the social status of the solicitor gives a false perception of credibility to the 
documents and the person whose identity is being verifi ed. 
  53  Law Society and HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Joint Property and Title Fraud Advice Note ’ ( 2017 ) available at:  www.
lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/articles/property-and-title-fraud-advice-note/ . See, generally,  P & P Property 
Ltd v Owen White  & Catlin LLP [ 2018 ]  EWCA Civ 1082 , [2018] Lloyd ’ s Rep FC 445. 
  54  J  Prasad ,  ‘ High-Profi le Case Shows how Property Fraud Can Happen ’ ( HM Land  Registry Blog , 
 16 January 2017 ) available at:  https://hmlandregistry.blog.gov.uk/2017/01/16/high-profi le-case-shows-how-property-
fraud-can-happen/ . 
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remain true even if the Law Commission ’ s recommendations in relation to identity checks 
are implemented. 55 A Land Registrar and Assistant Land Registrar confi rm that  ‘ [i]n the 
past 10 years, registration fraud has increased considerably ’, and that this is particularly the 
case with identity fraud. 56 
 An example of the sort of fraud that is possible on the  death of a registered proprietor 
is provided by the Land Registry Adjudicator ’ s decision in  Ijacic v Game Developments . 57 
Th e case is apparently rare in being  reported and concerning fraud involving a deceased 
registered proprietor, but this should not be taken as an indication that more such instances 
do not occur or that the risks are not signifi cant, even if the reported cases suggest that 
other forms of fraud are more common. At the time of his death in October 2006, Cetko 
Tripkovic was the sole registered proprietor of the property in which he lived. Probate was 
granted to his executor, Mr Ijacic, in 2007, but the executor chose not to become regis-
tered as the proprietor. In fact, Mr Tripkovic remained as the registered proprietor at the 
time of the adjudicator ’ s decision in 2009. Th e executor instructed a solicitors ’ fi rm, MED, 
to sell the property and account to the benefi ciaries under the will, who lived abroad. 
But in December 2007, a fraudster purporting to be Mr Tripkovic successfully applied 
to Link Lending (which was in administration at the time of the adjudicator ’ s decision) 58 
for a three-month bridging loan secured on the property. Th e fraudster declared that the 
property was unoccupied, giving addresses in Central London and Spain. He purported 
to supply copies of a page of Mr Tripkovic ’ s passport, his driving licence and his counter-
part driving licence. All had been apparently certifi ed by a solicitor (who, it appears, had 
been struck off  by the time of the adjudicator ’ s decision). 59 Copies of utility bills stamped 
by a bank and a bank statement were also supplied, addressed to Mr Tripkovic ’ s property, 
although the account number was diff erent from the one that the fraudster had given on the 
mortgage application form. Th e fraudster managed to execute a mortgage deed in the name 
of Mr Tripkovic, Link Lending was registered as the proprietor of a charge, and the loan 
money was advanced to the fraudster ’ s solicitors. 
 Aft er the approximately  £ 400,000 loan was not repaid in March 2008, Link Lending 
exercised its power of sale in favour of Game Developments. Although in January 2008 
MED had begun to send a trainee to the property around once a week to check that nothing 
untoward was happening, the fraud was not discovered until the day aft er Link Lending and 
Game Developments had completed the transfer, when estate agents instructed by MED 
failed to gain access to the property for a viewing because it had been secured by Link 
Lending ’ s agents. Game Developments did not apply to be registered as the proprietor until 
April 2008, and following Mr Ijacic ’ s objection was never so registered. 
 Th e adjudicator rectifi ed the register by removing the charge in favour of Link Lending, 
with that decision deemed to take eff ect before Game Developments ’ registration appli-
cation, there being no  ‘ exceptional circumstances ’ justifying the refusal of rectifi cation in 
  55  Law Commission ,  Updating the Land Registration Act 2002 ( Law Com No 380 ,  2018 ) [14.34] – [14.91]. 
  56  Pownall and Hill,  ‘ Th e Land Registry ’ s Perspective: Th e Practical Challenges of Land Registration ’ in Goymour 
(n 10 above) 12. 
  57  Ijacic v Game Developments (n 31 above). 
  58  Companies House,  https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/01568365/insolvency . 
  59  In the Matter of Harilal Susantha Fernando and Purantharan Rajoo, solicitors ,  fi ndings of the Solicitors Disci-
plinary Tribunal, No 10078-2008 ,  28 May 2009 . 
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circumstances where the chargee was not in possession. 60 Consequently he refused to regis-
ter Game Developments as the new proprietor and Mr Tripkovic remained. Th e adjudicator 
was also confi dent that Game Developments would receive an indemnity as  ‘ a refusal to 
register the transfer because the charge no longer existed at the date of Game ’ s original 
application would be a direct consequence of rectifi cation of the register ’. 61 While all may 
have been well that ended well, a preventative approach would surely be preferable: things 
would have been more diffi  cult if the estate benefi ciaries had been interested in the property 
per se or Link Lending had been a purchaser able to go into possession rather than a mere 
chargee. 
 Some protection against fraud would be provided if the registered proprietor had 
entered a Form LL restriction (specifi cally designed to combat identity theft ) while alive, 
which would prevent a disposition of an estate by the purported registered proprietor  ‘ with-
out a certifi cate signed by a conveyancer that that conveyancer is satisfi ed that the person 
who executed the document submitted for registration as disponor is the same person as 
the proprietor ’. 62 But if no such restriction has been entered then the estate benefi ciaries 
are vulnerable, and even then the conveyancer could be in cahoots with, or duped by, a 
fraudster. Th is restriction (free of charge if the property is not occupied) 63 could appar-
ently be entered post-death if the personal representative was registered as proprietor, but 
it has been seen that this may not happen at all and requires a grant of probate or letters of 
administration before it can happen. For similar reasons, a restriction in Form C, relating 
to dispositions by personal representatives other than by way of assent being declared to 
be in accordance with the will or intestacy rules, 64 would not solve the diffi  culty identifi ed 
here. 
 Th e routine use of a restriction Form Q by personal representatives may be a partial 
solution. Th is provides: 
 No disposition [ or specify type of disposition ] of the 
 [ choose whichever bulleted clause is appropriate ] 
•  registered estate by the proprietor of the registered estate 
•  registered charge dated [ date ] referred to above by the proprietor of that registered charge 
 is to be registered aft er the death of [ name of the current proprietor(s) whose personal representa-
tives ’ consent will be required ] without the written consent of the personal representatives of the 
deceased. 65 
 It is also possible to apply for a restriction that is not in standard form, and the application 
will be approved if it appears to the registrar that  ‘ the terms of the proposed restriction are 
reasonable ’ and that  ‘ applying the proposed restriction ’ would  ‘ be straightforward ’, and  ‘ not 
place an unreasonable burden on him ’. 66 A standard form restriction would, however, be 
  60  Land Registration Act 2002, sch 4, para 3(3). 
  61  Ijacic v Game Developments (n 31 above) [73] (Deputy Adjudicator Simon Brilliant); Land Registration 
Act 2002, sch 8. 
  62  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, sch 4. 
  63  HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Form: Restriction by Owner not Living at Property Request: Registration (RQ) ’, available 
at:  www.gov.uk/government/publications/restriction-by-owner-not-living-at-property-request-registration-rq . 
  64  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, sch 4. 
  65  ibid. 
  66  Land Registration Act 2002, s 43(3). 
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preferable in the sense of being something that could be routinely used in the context of 
estate administration and would attract a lower fee. 67 
 Th e basic diffi  culty remains even with a standard form restriction, however. Personal 
representatives are not expressly listed as  ‘ [p]ersons regarded as having a suffi  cient interest 
to apply for a restriction ’. 68 A person who is  ‘ entitled to be registered ’ as the relevant proprie-
tor is so listed, but a problem might be that a personal representative can prove that he is 
so entitled only once he has obtained a grant of probate or letters of administration, and we 
have seen that a vulnerability is present during an intervening period. 
 Th e fundamental issue is that the Land Registry may be completely unaware that a regis-
tered proprietor has died, at least until a grant of probate or letters of administration is 
obtained.  Ijacic demonstrates that this ignorance can extend beyond the grant if the personal 
representative takes no relevant action in relation to the property. It is not immediately clear 
how the Registry would react to receiving a death certifi cate relating to a registered proprie-
tor without (ie before) a grant of probate or letters of administration. It is to be hoped that 
such a certifi cate would not simply be ignored even if the personal representative does not 
yet have authority to deal with the land, such that a fraudster purporting to be the deceased 
person could subsequently do so. It must nevertheless be conceded that there is a chance 
that the risk of fraud might be  increased if the Land Registry makes it too obvious that a 
proprietor has died, which might justify a distinction between information that the Registry 
holds and that which it publishes. 69 In section IV of the chapter, the advantages of a new 
standard form restriction are considered. 
 Of course, as illustrated by  Ijacic , the Land Registration Act 2002 does contain 
mechanisms for rectifi cation 70 (demonstrating that indefeasibility of title is not taken to 
 ‘ extremes ’ ) 71 and indemnity 72 (albeit that the Law Commission ’ s suggested  ‘ long stop ’ will 
to some extent reduce the scope for rectifi cation as against an innocent purchaser). 73 Th ese 
mechanisms are logically set up to prejudice those who  ‘ by fraud or lack of proper care 
caused or substantially contributed to the mistake ’ (in the case of rectifi cation) 74 or where 
loss is suff ered wholly or partly as a result of fraud or lack of proper care. 75 Moreover, Ferris 
has said that  ‘ [a] system of prima facie eff ective title, subject to possible rectifi cation, is 
in principle a better system ’ than one involving  ‘ [p]rovisions that deny legal eff ect to the 
registration of forged documentation ’. 76 But as suggested above, it would be preferable to 
take more measures to prevent the fraud in the fi rst place rather than to attempt to cure 
it aft erwards, particularly given the onerous consequences of dealing with fraud for estate 
benefi ciaries at an upsetting time (even if they will ultimately be able to reverse its eff ect), 
the eff ect on public fi nances of the generous nature of the indemnity provisions under the 
  67  Compare Land Registration Fee Order 2013, SI 2013/3174, sch 3, para 1(1) and para 1(2). 
  68  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, sch 4, r 93; Land Registration Act 2002, s 43(1)(c). 
  69  See further Xu (n 39 above). 
  70  Land Registration Act 2002, sch 4. 
  71  Cooper (n 20 above) 108. 
  72  Land Registration Act 2002, sch 8. 
  73  Law Commission (n 55 above) ch 13. 
  74  Land Registration Act 2002, sch 4, para 6(2)(a). 
  75  ibid, sch 8, para 5. 
  76  G Ferris,  ‘ How Should a System of Registered Title to Property Respond to Fraud and Sharp Practice ? ’ in 
Conway and Hickey (n 2 above) 224. 
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2002 Act, 77 and indeed the cost to solicitors ’ fi rms due to professional indemnity insurance 
claims (oft en the fi rst port of call when a benefi ciary has lost out). Such professional indem-
nity issues would become particularly acute if, as the Law Commission has recommended, 
a specifi c statutory duty of care in relation to identity verifi cation were introduced. 78 
 A bank will freeze the account of a deceased person on receipt of a death certifi cate, 
usually very early on in the administration of the estate. 79 It is well established that one of the 
reasons that there exists a specifi c body of Land Law is the particular value and importance 
of land, 80 and it is strongly arguable that more eff ort should be made by the land registration 
system to secure registered land for the benefi t of true benefi ciaries. In  Ijacic , for example, 
it is noteworthy that the fraud had occurred  aft er the grant of probate and Mr Ijacic and/
or his advisors had probably decided not to involve the Registry in the administration of 
Mr Tripkovic ’ s estate until they had completed the intended (legitimate) sale. Moreover, it 
must also be conceded that elements other than the land register and fraudsters themselves 
contribute to fraud. If the fraudster ’ s solicitor or the lender had acted diff erently on the facts 
of that case, the fraud might not have been initially successful. 
 In addition to the use of standard form restrictions suggested above, one option would 
be to require the personal representatives to be registered as legal owners in circumstances 
(at least) where a sole registered proprietor has died, or within a certain period of the death 
if the land is not otherwise dealt with. Th is would be consistent with the general rule in the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925, and its implications will be considered further once 
co-owned land has been discussed in the next section. 
 III. Co-Owned Land 
 A. Co-Owned Property on Death 
 Particular risks that property will be misappropriated arise where registered land was 
co-owned (and therefore increasingly likely to be held on trust in the modern era) before 
death and there remain(s) one or more registered proprietor(s) aft er a registered proprie-
tor has died. Th is is especially true in circumstances where the deceased previously held 
the benefi cial title to the property as a tenant in common with a person or people who 
survive her. It is axiomatic that, where there was such a tenancy in common, the deceased ’ s 
entitlement passes under the will or intestacy rules rather than accruing to the remaining 
co-owner(s) by survivorship (as it would in the case of a joint tenancy). 81 It will be seen, 
however, that the land registration system might in some circumstances assist the surviving 
  77  See, eg,  M  Dixon ,  Modern Land Law ,  11th edn ( Abingdon ,  Routledge ,  2018 )  37 ; Law Commission (n 55 above) 
[14.16] – [14.21]. 
  78  Law Commission, ibid [14.62] – [14.73]. 
  79  Law Society, Society of Trust and Estates Practitioner and British Bankers ’ Association ,  ‘ Banking Practices 
Protocol: Estate Administration ’ ( 2016 ) [15]. 
  80  B  McFarlane ,  Th e Structure of Property Law ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2008 ) [3.1]. 
  81  See, eg,  B  McFarlane ,  N  Hopkins and  S  Nield ,  Land Law:  Text, Cases and Materials ,  4th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford 
University Press ,  2018 )  505 . 
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legal co-owner(s) in illegitimately asserting benefi cial entitlement to the property where 
they are  not entitled under the will or intestacy rules and someone else is instead, with 
profound consequences for both testamentary freedom and the rule of law. 
 Th at said, it must be conceded that the position with respect to land here refl ects that 
of other property subject to trusts, in that the personal representatives of a now-deceased 
trustee will not acquire the legal title to the property unless the deceased was herself the 
sole surviving trustee, 82 such that there is no need to transfer the legal title where there 
are surviving co-owners. 83 As regards jointly held bank accounts, for example,  ‘ it is well 
established that, upon a joint account holder ’ s death, the legal title to the chose in action 
representing the joint account vests entirely in the remaining account holder(s) by virtue 
of a right of survivorship ’. 84 As it was recently put by Lord Briggs in the Privy Council deci-
sion in  Whitlock v Moree ,  ‘ [s]urvivorship, that is the devolution of  … legal rights upon 
the survivor or survivors of joint owners is an inevitable, indeed inherent, aspect of joint 
legal title ’ 85 (albeit that  ‘ joint tenancy  … is only one of numerous ways in which prop-
erty may be co-owned benefi cially ’ ). 86 Th is creates a tension with the general principle 
that the legal title to the deceased ’ s assets vests in the personal representatives on death, 
and the duties that the personal representatives owe to the estate benefi ciaries in circum-
stances where the deceased was also a trust benefi ciary, but not one unique to land. Lord 
Briggs and the others in the majority in  Whitlock were anxious that essentially the same 
principles be applied to co-ownership regardless of the type of property involved, 87 although 
in dissent Lord Canwath expressed concern about this approach. 88 
 B. Tenancy in Common and Restrictions 
 While restrictions are in principle designed to protect those benefi cially entitled to land 
who are not on the legal title, this sub-section will demonstrate that they are not always able 
to perform this function where a registered proprietor dies. Where two or more persons 
are the registered proprietors of an estate in land, the registrar will be obliged to enter a 
Form A restriction unless the registrar is informed that the proprietors are trustees for 
themselves as benefi cial joint tenants, or that they are being registered in their capacity 
as personal representatives. 89 Th e entry of this restriction will therefore occur inter alia 
in circumstances where a tenancy in common is intended and the Land Registry has not 
been told otherwise, and the restriction ’ s purpose is to ensure that benefi cial interests are 
  82  Trustee Act 1925, s 18. 
  83  Land Registration Act 2002, s 27(5)(a). 
  84  EP  Ellinger ,  E  Lomnicka , and  C  Hare ,  Ellinger ’ s Modern Banking Law ,  5th edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2011 )  324 , implicitly approved in  Whitlock v Moree [ 2017 ]  UKPC 44 [60] (Lord Carnwarth, dissenting). 
  85  Whitlock v Moree (ibid) [21]. 
  86  ibid [22]. 
  87  ibid [26]. 
  88  ibid [55]. 
  89  Land Registration Act 2002, s 44; Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, r 95;  HM Land Registry ,  ‘ Prac-
tice Guide 24: Private Trusts of Land ’, available at:  www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-trusts-of-land/
practice-guide-24-private-trusts-of-land [1.3];  Ruoff  and Roper (n 51 above) [37.007];  Megarry  & Wade: Th e Law 
of Real Property ,  8th edn ( London ,  Sweet  & Maxwell ,  2012 ) [13-053]. 
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overreached on a purchase or charge, 90 meaning that the purchaser or chargee will take 
free of any benefi cial interests even if their holders would otherwise have had an overrid-
ing interest under  schedule 3, paragraph 2 of the Land Registration Act. 91 Th e restriction 
provides:  ‘ No disposition by a sole proprietor of the registered estate (except a trust 
corporation) under which capital money arises is to be registered except under an order 
of the Court. ’ 92 
 Signifi cantly for present purposes, a Form A restriction  ‘ will be cancelled  automatically  … 
when a transfer which overreaches any interests under a trust is registered ’. 93 Such cancella-
tion would therefore occur straightforwardly following a death where there is a disposition 
by two or more surviving trustees (even if not all conveyancers will seek to rely on such 
overreaching), potentially prejudicing benefi ciaries under the deceased ’ s will or the intes-
tacy rules who fi nd their interests overreached. It could be said that this is a straightforward 
operation of the Act in a manner that refl ects the  ‘ curtain principle ’ 94 and protects  ‘ dynamic ’ 
security (ie when the property moves to the ownership of an innocent purchaser) 95 as 
intended. 96 Such purchaser protection has been described as  ‘ the very foundation of land 
registration ’ according to the orthodox point of view. 97 Signifi cantly, the Law Commission 
concluded in its recently completed project on land registration that  ‘ given the curtain prin-
ciple  … , the existing mechanisms for the protection of benefi cial interests under trusts are 
suffi  cient and  … no further protection is appropriate ’. 98 Th at said, the distinction between 
dynamic and static security (ie protecting those people with existing interests in the prop-
erty from being deprived of those interests against their will) 99 is arguably less clear-cut with 
succession than in the inter vivos context because, while the surviving joint tenant or estate 
benefi ciary is not a  purchaser per se, the legal and benefi cial ownership of the land must 
inevitably move (or change) on death, and it could be seen as an important function of the 
land registration system to ensure that testamentary freedom, or alternatively the intestacy 
rules, are properly respected. 
 Th e current position does not necessarily deny a remedy to a wronged heir where over-
reaching validly occurs, but leaves the deceased ’ s heirs to pursue proprietary remedies in 
respect of the sale proceeds and personal remedies for breach of trust where appropriate. 100 
Th is risk of such a transaction taking place without the involvement of the deceased ’ s exec-
utor, however, is perhaps diffi  cult to square with the executor ’ s duties to get in, manage 
and distribute the property according to the terms of the will, 101 particularly where the 
purpose of the will was to give the benefi ciary an interest in the home per se. In this respect, 
  90  Law of Property Act 1925, ss 2, 27(2). 
  91  City of London Building Society v Flegg [ 1988 ]  AC 54 (HL) . 
  92  Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, sch 4. 
  93  HM Land Registry (n 29 above) [6]. 
  94  See, eg,  TBF  Ruoff  ,  ‘An Englishman Looks at the Torrens system :  Part II  – Simplicity and the Curtain Principle ’ 
( 1952 )  26  Australian Law Journal  162 . 
  95  E  Cooke ,  Th e New Law of Land Registration ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2003 )  100 . 
  96  See, eg, Law Commission (n 18 above) [10.43]. 
  97  Cooper (n 20 above) 108.  cf , eg,  HSBC Bank Plc v Dyche [ 2009 ]  EWHC 2954 (Ch) , [2010] BPIR 138. 
  98  Law Commission (n 18 above) [10.47]. 
  99  Cooke (n 95 above) 100. 
  100  See, eg,  G  Virgo ,  Principles of Equity and Trusts ,  3rd edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2018 ) Part VIII. 
  101  Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 25; see, eg, B Sloan,  Borkowski ’ s Law of Succession (n 1 above) ch 11. 
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it is worth noting Owen and Cahill ’ s claim in relation to overreaching that  ‘ in 1925 the 
 legislature was not trying to capture any features concerning the use of property primarily 
 as a home ’. 102 
 Th e current approach to trust property once a death occurs refl ects a distinctly formal-
istic and administrative position. Whatever protection is usually provided by conveyancers, 
the Land Registry is eff ectively permitted to ignore the fact that a Form A restriction essen-
tially signals a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy, and the substantive law 
implications of that, as long as overreaching occurs, (ie the correct number of trustees are 
selling the property). Of course, the remaining co-owners  may be benefi ciaries under the 
will or the intestacy rules, but in other circumstances the very purpose of the creation of a 
tenancy in common will have been to give the deceased ’ s share by her will to people who 
are not existing co-owners. Yet the land registration system is uninterested in that fact, even 
though the presence of the Form A restriction renders it particularly important for it to 
be clear that the registered proprietors are behaving properly. Of course, the current limi-
tations on the registrar ’ s interest are consistent with the express statutory statement that 
 ‘ [t]he registrar shall not be aff ected with notice of a trust ’. 103 It might also be said that, where 
the surviving co-owners are content to sell the property over the heads of the estate benefi -
ciaries, that indicates a level of animosity such that an application under the Trusts of Land 
and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 will be inevitable, 104 and that such an application is 
likely to produce a sale in any event by virtue of the courts ’ usual preference. 105 But a court 
application would at least allow the benefi ciary properly to put the case for retention of the 
property, and a court-ordered sale might reduce the risk that the sale proceeds will be dissi-
pated and therefore rendered unavailable to the benefi ciary. Th is is another situation where 
prevention is better than cure. 
 In the perhaps more usual situation where there is only one remaining trustee (such as 
a surviving spouse) once a co-owner has died, the Form A restriction will not be cancelled 
automatically and will catch any attempted disposition unless another trustee is appointed. 106 
Th is at least gives the personal representative an opportunity to become involved in a trans-
action if he becomes a legal owner (or to block it if no other legal owner can be found). 
Th e Land Registry ’ s Practice Guide nevertheless expressly states that even where a Form A 
restriction has not been automatically cancelled,  ‘ consideration should be given to applying 
to cancel any existing Form A restriction ’, even if only where  ‘ following the death of a joint 
proprietor a sole surviving proprietor has become the sole benefi cial owner ’. 107 Th e Guide 
actively advises that  ‘ applying to cancel the restriction at the earliest opportunity may avoid 
problems arising on a future disposition when the necessary evidence is no longer readily 
available ’. 108 Th e application would be made on Form RX3,  ‘ accompanied by evidence of the 
  102  G  Owen and  D  Cahill ,  ‘ Overreaching  – Getting the Right Balance ’ [ 2017 ]  Conv  26, 33 . 
  103  Land Registration Act 2002, s 78. 
  104  Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, ss 14 – 15. 
  105  M  Dixon ,  ‘ To Sell or not to Sell :  Th at is the Question  – Th e Irony of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 ’ ( 2011 )  70  CLJ  579 . 
  106  HM Land Registry (n 29 above) [6]. 
  107  ibid. 
  108  ibid. 
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equitable title to show that the sole survivor has become the sole benefi cial owner ’. 109 Th e 
evidence  ‘ usually ’ accepted is: 
 a statutory declaration or statement of truth  … by the sole surviving proprietor which shows how 
they have become the sole benefi cial owner by: 
•  explaining what has happened to the benefi cial interest protected by the restriction 
•  if it has devolved to the surviving proprietor, explaining how this happened 
•  confi rming, if it is true, that no one other than the registered proprietor now has a benefi cial 
interest in the property 
•  confi rming, if it is true, that no benefi cial interest in the property has been separately mort-
gaged or charged, and that no benefi cial owner is or was subject to a charging order or 
bankruptcy proceedings (a registered mortgage does not count). 110 
 Th e Land Registry confi rms that 
 [i]nstead of a statutory declaration or statement of truth, we will accept a certifi cate to [the] eff ect 
[of the evidence above] from the conveyancer acting for the surviving proprietor if they are able 
to speak from personal knowledge of the facts, 
 or  ‘ a court order requiring the registrar to cancel the restriction may be lodged ’. 111 
 It is noteworthy that there is no necessary consideration of the will or intestacy rules 
themselves in this procedure, which would demonstrate the fact (if true) that the surviving 
co-owner is actually benefi cially entitled to the whole property despite the fact that it was 
previously subject to a tenancy in common. Th is is consistent with the express negation 
of the Land Registry having a duty to enquire into the will, highlighted in the case of sole 
ownership above. It nevertheless seems odd to rely on the surviving co-owner ’ s word rather 
than the documentary evidence actually  establishing entitlement, or indeed to rely on the 
word of someone other than the personal representatives, whose duty it is to investigate 
the full facts and ensure that the will and/or the intestacy rules are properly implemented. 
Although it would be a dangerous strategy for a surviving co-owner to misrepresent the 
terms of a will (itself not immune from forgery) 112 in light of its status as a public docu-
ment, this is a possibility and the Law Society and Land Registry have noted the existence 
of  ‘ intra-family frauds that are perpetrated by family members, friends or partners ’. 113 In 
particular, the fact that the Land Registry does not even require a grant of representation 
as evidence in these cases means that there are circumstances (when no other assets in the 
estate require a grant) where a co-owner may entirely conceal the existence of a will dispos-
ing of the property to other (true) benefi ciaries, whereas the registration of the death itself is 
obligatory. 114 
 Th ere is also the issue that the verifi cation process applies only where the surviving 
co-owner is seeking to cancel the restriction. If the sole surviving owner were to appoint 
another trustee with whom he was in cahoots (perhaps a new partner), he could formally 
  109  ibid [7]. 
  110  ibid. 
  111  ibid. 
  112  See, eg,  In re the Estate of Patel [2017] EWHC 133 (Ch). 
  113  HM Land Registry and Law Society (n 45 above) 6. 
  114  Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, Part II. 
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 comply with the restriction and more easily circumvent the terms of the will or the intestacy 
rules. In such circumstances a survivor could (legitimately under the current law) avoid 
even obtaining a grant of probate where all the other signifi cant assets 115 in the estate are 
co-owned. 
 Th e next section considers some potential solutions to the problems identifi ed in this 
chapter. 
 IV. Possible Solutions 
 If there are thought to be problems with the law ’ s approach to registered land (whether 
previously co-owned or not) following a death, what might be the solutions ? 
 One possibility would be to  require personal representatives to be registered as legal 
owners. Th is would be consistent with the general rule that the legal title to the deceased ’ s 
assets vests in personal representatives on death and places the personal representative in a 
better position to perform their duties towards the benefi ciaries, even if it is not consistent 
with the general law ’ s approach to trusts per se where there remains a surviving trustee. 
It could be argued that land is very important, that trusts and co-ownership are partic-
ularly common in relation to land, that trustees of residential land are also likely to be 
benefi ciaries, and that these factors justify a distinctive approach to co-owned land. Such 
an approach is arguably already refl ected in the distinctive requirements for overreaching 
imposed in relation to land. 116 Th e requirement of registration of the personal representa-
tives would also be less radical than (for example) requiring the consent of the benefi ciary 
to the disposition of the property in all instances, and would thus protect dynamic secu-
rity to some extent. Th at said, while the fi duciary and other duties owed by a personal 
representative are potentially more likely to be performed where the personal representa-
tive is a professional third party such as a solicitor, the benefi ciary ’ s position is unlikely to 
be improved signifi cantly where the personal representative is also a surviving co-owner 
(such as a spouse) intent on selling the property against the interests or wishes of an estate 
benefi ciary. 
 A compromise falling short of the requirement of registration of the personal repre-
sentatives would be the ability, once the death has been registered but well before the issue 
of the grant of representation, for the personal representative to send the death certifi cate 
to the Land Registry and apply for a standard form restriction to be entered on the register. 
Th is restriction would purport to prevent anybody other than the personal representatives 
named on the eventual grant from disposing of the property (whether by sale or assent). 
A possible wording might be: 
 No disposition of the registered estate shall be registered unless accompanied by a Grant of Repre-
sentation appointing personal representatives to administer the estate of [ insert name of deceased ], 
and the disposition is made by those personal representatives named in the Grant. 
  115  See also, eg, Administration of Estates (Small Payments) Act 1965. 
  116  See generally,  D  Fox ,  ‘ Overreaching ’ in  P  Birks and  A  Pretto (eds),  Breach of Trust ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing , 
 2002 ) . 
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 A variation would be to use a Form Q restriction, requiring  consent of the personal 
representative(s), but allow it to be sought upon production of a death certifi cate and before 
a grant of representation. 
 Th is standard form restriction proposal would refl ect the system adopted by banks, 
investment companies and most other fi nancial institutions, 117 and so logically it should be 
available for land. If such a step became an industry standard within estate administration, 
solicitors ’ fi rms who fail to protect the estate ’ s interests in the land in this way could be liable 
in negligence and the loss covered by their indemnity insurance, therefore perhaps increas-
ing the options for benefi ciaries in seeking a remedy. Th e proposal would be a compromise 
between preventing fraud and refl ecting the fact that the personal representative does not 
yet have authority to deal with the land. Obligations to enter restrictions are not unknown 
to the land registration system, as shown by the joint proprietorship obligation discussed 
in the previous section of this chapter. 118 If an obligation is thought inappropriate, this 
may be a situation where the registrar should exercise his power to enter a restriction that 
is  ‘ necessary or desirable ’ for the purpose of  ‘ preventing invalidity or unlawfulness in rela-
tion to dispositions of a registered estate or charge ’. 119 
 A personal representative is not himself immune from impersonation, and the Law 
Society and Land Registry specifi cally recognised  ‘ a personal representative responsible for 
a property where the owner has died and the property is to be sold ’ as a vulnerable client for 
these purposes. 120 Th at said, if a restriction were entered from the moment a death certifi -
cate is received, requiring production of the grant of probate or letters of administration 
before the land can be dealt with, the true personal representative will have little trouble in 
transferring the land to either true benefi ciaries or legitimate purchasers. Th e land will in all 
likelihood be used by those truly entitled and the risk of fraud is reduced. 
 One further step could be to include the Land Registry within the Government ’ s  ‘ Tell Us 
Once ’ system. 121 When registering a death, the informant can (with the help of the registrar 
of births and deaths) complete a short application such that  ‘ parts of the DWP and other 
organisations such as HMRC, Local Authorities ’ Family Information Services and Library 
Services ’ are essentially automatically informed of the death. 122 It would not be unrealistic 
for the Land Registry also to be informed under this scheme, and a notice or restriction then 
automatically entered on each title for which the deceased is a registered proprietor. Th is 
would serve the desirable objective of an up-to-date register. 
 As regards previously co-owned land held on trust, one possibility might be to pull 
back the  ‘ curtain ’ and allow the substantive registration of trust interests (or their protec-
tion by notice), which creates the potential for the true nature of interests under trusts 123 
to be refl ected on the register. 124 In addition to the potential for greater protection for the 
interests concerned, this would also be consistent with the drive towards transparency in 
  117  See, eg, Law Society et al (n 79 above). 
  118  Land Registration Act 2002, s 44(1). 
  119  Land Registration Act 2002, s 42(1)(a). 
  120  HM Land Registry and Law Society (n 45 above) 9. 
  121  Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 135, inserting Registration Service Act 1953, s 19A; Gov.uk,  ‘ What to do aft er 
Someone Dies: Tell Us Once ’,  www.gov.uk/aft er-a-death/organisations-you-need-to-contact-and-tell-us-once . 
  122  Explanatory Notes to the Welfare Reform Act 2012 [692]. 
  123  Implied, resulting and constructive trusts aside. 
  124  See, eg, Owen and Cahill (n 102 above) 37 – 40. 
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trust interests. 125 Th e eff ect of a registration requirement would be limited, however, by the 
fact that an estate benefi ciary does not acquire a fully-fl edged proprietary interest in the 
estate assets until the process of estate administration is complete (unless he was previously 
an inter vivos trust benefi ciary), 126 although the equity to compel due administration of 
the estate may currently be protectable by notice. 127 Registration of a benefi ciary ’ s interest 
would in any case require accurate information to be made available in the fi rst place to 
would-be trust benefi ciaries following a death. 
 Finally, it could be possible to require the Land Registry to examine the grant of probate 
or of letters of administration, together with any will and trust document and having appro-
priately verifi ed relevant identities. Such evidence could be scrutinised in any circumstance 
where surviving co-owner(s) are claiming that no one other than themselves is benefi cially 
entitled following a death, at least in circumstances where there is reason to believe that the 
property was held subject to a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy by the time of 
the death. Th is suggestion would involve more substantive examination of trust terms than 
is currently the case, but is arguably simply a stronger form of evidence than is currently 
required for the Registry ’ s existing verifi cation processes. 
 V. Conclusion 
 We have demonstrated that in both sole- and co-owner situations the current law and prac-
tice place greater emphasis on the importance of the conclusiveness of the land register 
than on the need to protect the rights of true testamentary or intestacy benefi ciaries in 
the context of registered land, in some cases placing the land registration system at odds 
with the general law, logic and normative principle. Th is sidelining of testamentary freedom 
becomes more acute in the current climate where sophisticated property fraud is on the 
rise, and the lack of simple protective mechanisms could easily result in the true benefi ciary 
losing out. 
 On the orthodox account, the current land registration system ’ s focus is to protect 
the innocent third-party purchaser, but Cooper has said that  ‘ a fi xed purchaser protection 
rule  … might perversely take the land from a party who cherishes its uniqueness in order to 
reallocate it to a party who regards it only as a characterless repository of wealth ’. 128 Such an 
approach would be in clear tension with succession law ’ s principles of testamentary freedom 
and passing on property as a home to loved ones. While testamentary freedom is not and 
should not be an absolute principle, it should be qualifi ed through transparent and lawful 
mechanisms rather than the possibility of fraud and breach of trust. Although innocent 
purchasers must of course be off ered security, and although the judiciary have found ways 
  125  See the debates (discussed ibid) surrounding  Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the fi nancial 
system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist funding, amending Regulation 648/2012 and repealing 
Directive 2005/60 and Commission Directive 2006/70 [ 2015 ]  OJ L141/73 .  cf  F  Noseda ,  ‘ For or Against the Regis-
tration of Trusts  – Why it Matters :  Balancing Regulatory Concerns and the Right to Privacy ’ [ 2014 ]  Private Client 
Business  137 and Evans (n 41 above). 
  126  Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [ 1965 ]  AC 694 (PC) . 
  127  Land Registration Act 2002, s 115;  cf s 33. 
  128  Cooper (n 20 above) 131. 
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to reduce innocent purchaser protection where arguably appropriate, 129 perhaps Owen and 
Cahill have a point when they say that  ‘ the scales need resetting ’ when balancing overreach-
ing with benefi cial interests that can be applied to the succession context. 130 
 Th e ease with which benefi cial ownership can prima facie be extinguished on the land 
register adds to this tension. Th e most recent Land Registration Act is now 17 years old, and 
the blas é attitude shown by the Act towards benefi cial interests is perhaps starting to look 
outdated in the current climate of transparency propounded by recent anti-money launder-
ing legislation, and advocated directly in the land registration context by Owen and Cahill. 
Furthermore, as Ferris puts it:  ‘ Land registration cannot be reduced to the single objective of 
lowering transaction costs at the cost of static security and principles of justice. Th e system 
has a fundamental interest in the protection of static security ’. 131 
 Whilst the Money Laundering Regulations have tightened up the identifi cation require-
ments for conveyancers, the Law Commission has proposed reforms to identity verifi cation 
and the Land Registration Act 2002 provides mechanisms for rectifi cation and indemnity 
in the case where a true owner or chargee has lost out due to fraud, there is surely a case 
for introducing a simple preventative mechanism such as the entry of a restriction on the 
register on production of a death certifi cate to reduce the ease with which fraud can be 
perpetrated. Th is must be preferable to the protracted and upsetting process of untangling 
the mess once it has happened. Given the huge monetary and societal value placed on land, 
most of our suggestions do not seek fundamentally to change the nature of land registration, 
but rather to assist the land registration system to provide a just, rather than merely a proce-
durally correct, outcome. Our proposals would also have the by-product of increasing the 
accuracy of the register, and thus help to reduce the tension between testamentary freedom 
and dynamic security identifi ed in this chapter. 
  129  See, eg, Goymour (n 12 above). 
  130  Owen and Cahill (n 102 above). 
  131  Ferris (n 76 above) 234. 
